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Abstract: The spatial distribution of resources and the behavior of a species lead to a spatial pattern of density which has been 
called the concentration profile of the species. Some species aggregate and may be found almost entirely at high densities, 
other species space themselves much more uniformly and are usually found at low densities, and some species are found at a 
very wide range of densities. The interaction between the concentration profile, fishing, and management behavior leads to a 
number of surprising consequences. Fishermen will naturally tend to fish in the most profitable places, so that the interaction 
between the concentration profile of the species and the behavior of the fishermen will lead to a complex spatial pattern in 
abundance, profitability, and catch per unit effort (CPUE). Among the behaviors that emerge from such analysis are (i) overall 
CPUE will frequently decline more rapidly than abundance, (ii) CPUE will provide almost no information about abundance 
that can be used for management except on the smallest of spatial scales, and (iii) changes in price or costs of fishing may 
have significant impacts on the spatial pattern of fishing effort and the associated CPUE. We illustrate these principles in 
detail with examples from the Tasmanian abalone fishery on a small scale (tens of metres) and a large scale (hundreds of 
kilometres). Recognition of the concentration profile of the stock suggests that regulatory measures must be carefully tuned to 
the biology of the species. CPUE will almost certainly be a very poor measure of stock abundance, while fishery-independent 
surveys will provide the only reliable method of estimating stock status. Complex spatial structure, with differences in growth 
and mortality will mean that size limits and harvest rates should be finely tuned to the spatial structure of the stock and cannot 
be set appropriately over large areas. We consider alternative regulatory schemes such as quotas, seasons, size limits, and 
territorial fishing rights allocations in relation to concentration profiles and suggest that territorial fishing rights offer the 
greatest potential benefits. 
Resume: La distribution spatiale des ressources et le comportement d'une espece menent a une repartition spatiale de la 
densite que l'on a appelee le profil de concentration d'une espece. Certaines especcs sc rasscmblent et se rencontrent presque 
exclusivement a des densites elevees, certaines se repartissent de maniere beaucoup plus uniforme dans l'espace et, enfin, 
certaines presentent une repartition selon une tres grande variete de densites. L'interaction entre le profil de concentration, la 
peche et le comportement de gestion mene a des consequences etonnantes. Les pecheurs ont naturellement tendance a · 
pratiquer Ia peche dans les endroits ou cette activite est le plus rentable, de sorte que !'interaction entre le profil de 
concentration de l'espece et le comportement des pecheurs sera a l'origine d'une distribution spatiale complexe en ce qui a 
trait a l'abondance, a Ia rentabilite et les prises par unite d'effort (PUE). Parmi les comportements qui ressortent d'une telle 
analyse figurent les suivants : ( i) le PUE global declinera frequemment plus rapidement que 1' abondance, (ii) le PUE ne donne 
presque pas d'information sur l'abondance qui puisse servir ala gestion, sauf ala plus petite des echelles spatiales, et (iii) les 
changements touchant les prix ou les cofits lies a Ia peche peuvent avoir des repercussions substantielles sur la distribution 
spatiale de !'effort de peche et le PUE correspondant. Nous illustrons ces principes en detail avec des exemples tires de la 
pecherie d'haliotides de Tasmanie a petite echelle (dizaines de metres) eta grande echelle (centaines de kilometres). La 
reconnaissance du profil de concentration du stock laisse supposer que les mesures de reglementation doivent etre 
soigneusement harmonisees avec Ja·biologie de l'espece. Le PUE constituera presque certainementune mesure mediocre de 
l'abondance du stock, alors que les releves independants de Ia pecherie constitueront Ia seule methode fiable pour estimer 
l'etat du stock. La structure spatiale complexe, comportant des differences en ce qui a trait ala croissance eta la mortalite, 
signifiera que les limites de taille et les taux de recolte devront etre ajustes fmement ala structure spatiale du stock et qu'ils ne 
peuvent etre appliques de maniere appropriee sur de vastes etendues. Nous prenons en consideration d'autres mesures de 
reglementation comme !'attribution de quotas, les saisons de peche, les limites de taille et les droits de peche territoriaux en 
rapport avec les profils de concentration et estimons que ce sont les droits de peche territoriaux qui presentent le plus 
d'avantages potentiels. [Traduit par la Redaction] 
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Few invertebrate resources are spatially homogeneous, indi-
viduals are almost always found in higher concentrations in 
some locations. This distribution of concentrations has many 
implications for the biology and management of invertebrates 
and its importance has been noted for many years. Gross and 
Smyth (1946) suggested that very high density concentrations 
of oysters may be required for reproductive success. Caddy 
(1975) and Orensanz (1986) described the spatial pattern of 
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Fig. 1. Types of concentration profiles. 
.!!! 
CD 
E 
10 
10 
9 
i 6 
0 5 
.. 4 ~ 3 
£ 2 
2 
Type I 
6 10 
Density 
Type Ill 
10 
Density 
concentration in different scallop populations and discussed 
biological and management implications of these distributions. 
Clark ( 1982) introduced the term "concentration profile" to 
the fisheries literature and considered a number of theoretical 
implications of different concentration profiles on the behavior 
of fishermen and interpretation of catch-per-unit-effort 
(CPUE). Clark borrowed the term from mining, where the con-
centration profile refers to how much of the desired mineral 
can be found at different concentrations in the ground. For any 
mineral, the profitability of mining depends primarily on how 
much recoverable mineral there is per ton of material proc-
essed. Below some concentrations it is not economic to process 
the material. A potential miner is not interested so much in how 
much mineral is in an area as he is in the amount of ore that 
exists at profitable concentrations. 
This is equally true of fishers. Most fish do not occur at 
densities that can be profitably harvested, yet the key to an 
economically viable fishery is the number of fish that can be 
found at high concentrations. Clark introduced four types of 
concentration profiles, shown in Fig. 1. Type I profiles have a 
diminishing number of individuals found at higher densities; 
type II profiles have a uniform distribution; type III have indi-
viduals spread out over a range of densities with most found 
at an intermediate density; and type IV profiles have almost all 
individuals found at a single density. 
Concentration profiles for anchovy in California and 
skipjack tuna in the western Pacific were shown in Hilborn and 
Walters (1992). Both showed type III profiles. The data from 
Orensanz ( 1986) are shown as a concentration profile in Fig. 2. 
It appears to be a type II profile. 
Concentration profiles result from the interaction of habitat 
quality, the behavior ofthe fish, and the harvesting history. For 
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instance, type IV profiles would be expected to result if the 
fish were highly aggregating, whereas a type I might result if 
fish density depended exclusively upon habitat quality and 
there were many more poor than good areas. 
The purpose of this paper is to review what is known about 
the concentration profiles in invertebrate fisheries and consider 
the implications of concentration profiles for management. we 
begin with a discussion of the interaction between concentra-
tion profiles and fishermen's behavior and then explore exam-
ples of the small-scale and large-scale concentration profiles 
for abalone in Tasmania. 
Fishermen's behavior and concentration 
profiles 
The earliest formal theory of how fishermen will respond to the 
concentration profile of the fish stock was described by Gor-
don (1953 ), who suggested that fishermen would attempt to 
maximize their profits by optimizing the costs of fishing with 
the rates of return. If the initial abundance of a fish resource 
was uniform, fishermen would begin by fishing close to home 
port, and as local stocks became depleted, they would move 
farther away, at all times assuring that the expected rate of 
return in all areas fished was the same. If for some reason the 
rate of return (income minus costs) were to rise in an area 
relative to other areas, additional effort would flow into that 
area, and if the rate of return were to drop relative to other 
areas, then effort would leave. 
Beverton and Holt (1957) provide a similar discussion, and 
the theory was popularized in the ecological literature by Fret-
well and Lucas (1970) and given the name of "ideal free 
distribution." Hilborn and Ledbetter (1979) showed that 
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Fig. 2. Concentration profile from Orensanz data. 
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fishermen in the British Columbia purse seine fishery appeared 
to behave according to these rules, and Clark (1982, 1985) used 
this theory in his analysis of the implications of concentration 
profiles. Since then a number of authors have found that fish-
ermen behave as predicted (Abrahams and Healey 1990; Hil-
born and Kennedy 1992). 
If we assume that fishermen have good information about 
the location and density of the population or can learn this in 
the process of fishing, then it is quite natural that fishers will 
begin fishing at the highest concentrations and gradually work 
down to lower concentrations until they reach a concentration 
at which fishing is no longer profitable. The threshold of prof-
itability will depend upon a number of factors associated with 
the cost of fishing, which may include distance from port, 
probability of gear loss, depth, etc. In the aggregate, however, 
we would expect that the natural pattern would be for the high-
est concentrations to be removed first. 
As discussed in Hilborn and Walters ( 1992) such a behavior 
would mean that in a type I profile the CPUE would initially 
decline more rapidly than abundance. The few very good sites 
would be fished first and, assuming the CPUE depends on the 
density in the area fished, as fishermen moved to lower density 
sites, the CPUE would drop. If the concentration profile had a 
long right tail, the CPUE might initially drop substantially 
even if only a very small fraction of the total population had 
been removed. However, with a type IV profile, the CPUE 
would stay constant while the population was being depleted, 
a phenomenon that has been observed with a number of 
strongly schooling fish. 
Assuming there are differential costs of fishing in different 
areas, the CPUE will reflect the costs of fishing at any time in 
the development of the fishery, so that the profitability in each 
area will be the same. Areas with high costs will have higher 
CPUE. Under such circumstances, changes in price will have 
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a significant effect on CPUE. If the price of the product goes 
up, areas of high CPUE would be relatively more profitable 
and areas which had not been profitable before would suddenly 
become profitable, and it has been shown (Hilborn and Walters 
1987) that the average CPUE can increase. Similarly, if prices 
dropped, CPUE would be expected to decrease. Thus aggre-
gate measures of CPUE are subject to changes in the price and 
cost of fishing in a rather surprising fashion. 
Small-scale concentration profiles 
The nature of small-scale concentration profiles was demon-
strated in an experiment conducted by Prince (1989). A small 
reef in Tasmania, named George III rock, had been maintained 
as a reserve for abalone for a number of years. In July of 1987, 
four volunteer licensed abalone divers spent seven days fishing 
this reef, recording each dive location and the catch. In the first 
few days most divers concentrated on the shallow areas of the 
reef where most abalone were found. As the shallower areas 
were fished down, the divers moved to deeper areas ofthe reef 
where densities had initially been lower. Figure 3 shows the 
CPUE in abalone per minute at the beginning of the experiment 
and at the end. Whereas initially the CPUE was much higher 
in shallow sites, by the end of the 7 days of fishing the CPUE 
was higher in deeper sites. This is all consistent with the theory 
that divers prefer to work in shallow water because of health 
and comfort considerations, and that in a "developed" fishery, 
the CPUE will be higher at high-cost (in this case deeper) sites. 
The reef was divided into 29 roughly equal-sized areas and 
an analysis of the initial densities in each area revealed a type 
III or type IV concentration profile. This experiment demon-
strated that concentration profiles exist on very small scales; 
the George III rock was <I km2• This distribution of 
differential densities after the fishery is presumably what the 
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Fig. 3. Kilograms of abalone captured per minute plotted against depth shown for the first days diving (light bars) and the last days diving 
(dark bars) from the George III reef. 
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Fig. 4. Total catch (light line) and effort (dark line) for theTasmanian abalone fishery. 
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fine scale structure of abalone abundance looks like throughout 
Tasmania and likely wherever species like abalone occur and 
are fished. The key observation is that the initial high concen-
tration sites will be fished down and the remaining concentra-
tion profile will reflect the cost of fishing, with deep areas 
having higher concentrations than shallow areas. Areas that 
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have high costs of fishing for other reasons would also be 
expected to have high concentrations. 
Large-scale concentration profiles 
We can use this understanding of the determinants of where 
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Fig. 5. CPUE trends in Tasmanian abalone fishery. The thick line in the middle represents average CPUE, the thin line on top is the CPUE for 
west coast sites, and the thin line on the bottom is CPUE for east coast sites. 
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Fig. 6. Map of Tasmania showing statistical areas; circles represent 
number of individual licensed divers with a home in each 
community. 
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fishers go and what determines catch rates to understand the 
evolution of the entire Tasmanian abalone fishery, in particular 
how the small- and large-scale patterns of concentration and 
costs affect the interpretation of CPUE trends in the fishery. 
Historical trends 
Prior to 1963, the Tasmania abalone stock was essentially un-
touched, but by 1963, modem diving equipment and the recog-
nition of Asian markets provided the needed basis for the 
modem industry. Figure 4 shows the catch and effort trends in 
the fishery from 1965 to 1987. Total catch rose rapidly from 
1963 to 1967, fluctuated between2500 and 3500 tons between 
1967 and 1975, and rose steadilyuntil1984, when a system of 
individual transferable quotas was introduced. Effort shows 
essentially the same trends with somewhat less vadation be-
tween 1967 and 1975. 
Figure 5 shows the trends in catch-per-unit-effort, meas-
ured in kilograms per diver-hour under water for the west 
coast, east coast, and total. The total pattern is rather stable, 
with a small initial drop in CPUE, a rise in 1970 and 1971, 
followed by another small decline, and then minor fluctua-
tions. If we were to assume that CPUE is proportional to abun-
dance, our interpretation would be that there had been only a 
minor decline in abundance since the development of the fish-
ery. The fact that CPUE has remained essentially unchanged 
since 1974 while effmt and catch have tripled, suggests either 
that the stock is remarkably resilient, or that CPUE is not pro-
portional to abundance. We consider alternative interpretations 
of the CPUE trend in a later section, but to do this it is neces-
sary to first examine the mechanics of the abalone fishery. 
Abalone are taken from rocky bottom areas between 2 and 
··-----·-----------------------------------
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Fig. 7. Distribution of total catch (vertical bars) and average CPUE (solid line) by statistical area. 
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30 m in depth around the entire coast of Tasmania. There are 
125 licensed divers who must do their own diving. Divers 
operate from small, outboard-powered boats, either 4-m din-
ghies or 7-m runabouts, using hookah gear which pumps air to 
the diver from the surface. Nearly all divers employ a surface 
deckhand who manipulates the boat and lifts nets of harvested 
abalone into the vessel. The divers typically spend 4-5 h per 
day under water and move along the bottom, harvesting all 
abalone above the legal size limit. Although diving methods 
do differ between individuals, divers typically might search 
20 m2·min-1 and encounter 0.1-2.0 abalone·m-2. 
Most divers prefer to undertake daily fishing trips from their 
home ports using the larger, twin-hulled, 7-m runabouts. The 
range on these trips is generally 20-40 km from the point of 
launching, although distances as great as 80 km may be trav-
eled if the weather is favorable. The best fishing grounds, how-
ever, are on the isolated west coast of Tasmania. Divers fish 
these areas on extended trips (3-7 days), operating from 15 to 
30 m motherships, with each diver and his assistant using a 
4-m dinghy for daily trips up to 15 km away from the mother-
ship. 
Spatial structure 
Figure 6 shows a map of Tasmania with the statistical areas 
used for the collection of abalone data. Also shown are the 
major home ports of abalone fishermen, with the size of the 
circle representing the number of divers who live in those com-
munities. Nearly all divers live on the east coast which is well 
serviced by roads and has many small communities. In con-
trast, the west coast is very isolated, has only one real access 
point at Strahan, and is far from the major urban centers of 
Hobart and Launceston. 
Figure 7 shows the distribution of abalone catch (bar graph), 
with totals from 1965 to 1986 by statistical area. The catch 
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comes predominantly from the west coast and a second area of 
major productivity on the south and east coasts. The north coast 
and Flinders and King Islands are unproductive. Figure 7 also 
shows the average catch rate (kg·h-1) from 1965 to 1986 by 
statistical area. The data lump quite nicely into two groups, the 
west coast (areas 5-12) and the south and east coasts (areas 
13-31). We can ignore areas 1-4 and areas 32-49 simply be-
cause the total catch in these areas is trivial. We therefore 
consider the fishery as consisting of two major areas, the west 
coast which is far from home, exposed to the prevailing winds 
and has few safe shelters, and the east coast which is close to 
home, to the leeward, and has many ports and protected an- . 
chorages. The west coast has high catch rates, the east coast 
has low catch rates. 
Alternative hypotheses 
Alternative hypotheses to explain the trend in CPUE have been 
discussed by Harrison (1983) and include increased mechani-
cal efficiency, motivation, and skill. Harrison's primary con-
cern was to attempt to calibrate the data to be used in stock 
assessment. In this paper we are primarily interested in describ-
ing the characteristics of the fishery and how different mecha-
nisms interact to produce observed CPUE trends. We will not 
attempt to produce a final 'calibrated' CPUE trend and, indeed, 
we believe this cannot and should not be done. 
We begin by discussing alternative hypotheses, the details 
of the hypotheses, and how the concentration profiles, on the 
small and large scale, would impact them. In the subsequent 
section we will look at particular aspects ofthe spatial structure 
and the CPUE trends to try to understand the relative impor-
tance of the different mechanisms. 
Fishermen's movement 
The spatial structure of the fishery and the sedentary natUre of 
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Fig. 8. Price ofabalone (solid line) and sale price of commercial abalone license. 
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the exploited stocks assure that movement patterns will have 
an important effect on catch rates. This has been noted pre-
viously as an important factor for other abalone fisheries. In the 
simplest case, we might imagine a pattern of sequential deple-
tion where divers simply clean out reefs that are close to har-
bors and anchorages and then move farther and farther away. 
The CPUE could easily stay constant while the total abundance 
declined drastically. Abalone fisheries would therefore be 
more like mining operations than fisheries. However, we be-
lieve more complex interactions between movement, stock 
abundance, and motivation of divers continue to occur over the 
complete range of spatial scales and these will be examined 
below. 
Increased mechanical efficiency 
Two major technical changes have taken place since the begin-
ning of the fishery. Before 1969, hookah equipment displaced 
SCUBA equipment, extending the time available for diving, 
and reducing the amount of equipment required, and since 
about 1971, divers employ deckhands who follow them with 
the vessels and untangle air hoses, allowing unrestricted move-
ment. Moreover, diving suits continue to be more efficient and 
more comfortable, enabling divers to spend more time under-
water. The use of dive computers and motherships have also 
been noted as technical innovations increasing efficiency. 
We expect these increases in mechanical efficiency to affect 
the fishery in two substantially different ways. The use of hoo-
kah equipment and improvements in diving suits increased the 
number of hours spent diving each day without a major effect 
on the hourly catch rate, whereas the use of deckhands should 
have directly affected the catch rates without increasing the 
total hours worked. 
Increasing knowledge and skill 
Diver skill can vary within the fishery both individually and 
1975 
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collectively. The rudimentary skill of hookah diving is easily 
acquired, but the real skill of an abalone diver is his ability to 
quickly locate abalone stocks in unfamiliar areas and to be able 
to find these stocks again in the future. Another aspect of diver 
skill involves the knowledge a diver accumulates about stock 
abundance and his general familiarity with fishing sites. We 
examined the catch rate of new divers against the number of 
months they had been in the fishery and found that while their 
initial catch rates were about 30 kg·h-1, within five months 
they were catching 60-70 kg·h-1 and this did not change with 
more experience. This rise in catch rate will reflect both in-
creasing skill/experience and may also reflect a willingness of 
new divers to fish at deeper sites. This we cannot document but 
it is related to motivation. 
Motivation 
Once we accept the small-scale and l!!Ige-scale concentration 
profiles and the interaction between costs of fishing and CPUE, 
motivation determines individual diver's choice of where to 
fish. On the small scale this reflects how frequently they will 
be willing to dive deep, and on tl1e large scale how frequently 
they will go to the west coast. The need to earn income can be 
a primary influence on a diver's motivation. A diver seeking to 
service debts, establish himself fmancially, and purchase fish-
ing equipment in the early years of his career will almost cer-
tainly be willing to dive deeper or go to the west coast more 
often than divers who are financially secure. 
The price offered for abalone has fluctuated widely at times 
(Fig. 8) and has also affected the motivation of divers. High 
prices encourage divers to work hard and take advantage of 
'windfall profits,' while low prices may reduce or increase the 
motivation of divers depending on their financial need. Those 
with a high need may be forced to work harder, while others 
may choose not to land catch at the lower price. 
Competition is also a source of motivation. Harrison (1983) 
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reported that established divers without financial needs in-
creased their fishing activity purely to compete with the new, 
harder-working divers who entered the industry after 1974. 
Motivation determines how a diver allocates his effort over 
a range of fishing sites. Divers will seek to minimize their risk 
and maximize their comfort both within their general life-style 
and within their diving practice. To maximize comfort, divers 
favor short day trips from their home ports rather than extended 
trips. This gives them more time to enjoy being at home with 
their families. Many divers prefer to work exclusively from 
their home ports and avoid extended trips to the west and south 
coasts. The preference for fishing close to home has been dis-
cussed in the literature as theoretically reasonable (Gordon 
1954; Beverton and Holt 1957), and has been demonstrated 
empirically (Hilborn and Ledbetter 1979). 
A constant concern is diving-related diseases, particularly 
dysbaric osteonecrosis, exacerbated by diving time and depth, 
which causes divers to favor diving in shallow depths (<10m). 
This concern and the concerns about the bends are the two 
major reasons for divers' preference of shallow areas. 
Specific events 
We can use our understanding of the interaction of concentra-
tion profiles and divers' behavior to analyze the historical de-
. velopment of the fishery. In this section we divide this history 
into a number of periods, characterized primarily by licensing 
changes and consequent changes on motivation and license 
price, and discuss what we believe explains the changes that 
occurred. 
1965-1968 Development of the fishery 
Until1969, anyone could enter the fishery for an annual $5.00 
license fee. There were few full-time abalone divers since most 
divers held full-time jobs outside the fishing sector. Figure 5 
shows the CPUE trends for the total fishery, as well as west 
coast and east coast areas separately. The total CPUE declines 
rather strongly during this period, dropping roughly 35% be-
tween 1965 and 1968. This is almost certainly due to declining 
abalone abundance, moderated by considerable improvement 
in diving equipment, practices, and knowledge of the diving 
areas. Harrison (1983) estimated that diving efficiency was 
twice as high in 1969 as in 1965. Much of this increasing 
efficiency would have been communal rather than personal 
since anecdotal information suggests a great turnover of divers 
during this period. Of particular interest is the marked decline 
of the fishery on the east coast during the first ten years, with-
out developing a similar pattern on the west coast. 
1969-1974 Limited entry, but nontransferable licenses 
In 1969, limited entry was introduced. Fishermen had to earn 
their income primarily from the fishery, forcing them to be 
full-time divers. These measures, along with the introduction 
of an annual $100 license fee decreased the number of divers 
from over 250 to 120 (in 1973, an additional five restricted 
divers were allowed entry). This resulted in an overall decrease 
in effort between 1968 and 1969 (Fig. 4). The drop is not pro-
portional to the number of divers leaving the fishery because 
the number of hours per diver-day increased slightly and the 
number of days in the water per diver increased by approxi-
mately 40%. During this time, licenses could not be trans-
ferred; a diver wishing to leave the industry relinquished his 
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diving entitlement to the state fisheries department which re-
allocated the license to the next person on a waiting list of 
applicants. Because of this very few divers left the industry 
during this period. The year 1969 provides a major breakpoint 
in terms of professionalism and motivation. While the price 
remained relatively low, the divers involved had the economic 
need to upgrade their equipment to a professional standard and 
the desire to establish themselves economically. 
Divers' motivation is thought to have dropped considerably 
during 1972-1974. This is consistent with the fact that the 
number of hours dived per day declined while the number of 
days dived remained stable. Moreover, the proportion of effort 
expended on the west coast declined. This should be expected, 
since the divers did well fmancially during 1969-1971. They 
are likely to have had low levels of debt as they did not have 
to buy an entitlement to enter the industry. They also had the 
benefit of fishing relatively virgin stocks on the west coast. As 
a result, it is likely that they were able to pay for the plant and 
equipment needed and establish some level of economic secu-
rity. As prices rose from $0.23 in 1969 to $0.94 in 1974 and 
the divers began to become aware of the health risks of exten-
sive diving, motivation would have continued to decline. Di-
vers began to lobby the government to allow them to nominate 
to whom to transfer their entitlement if they left the industry. 
In other Australian fisheries this had already happened, effec-
tively allowing fishermen to sell their fishing entitlement on 
the open market. In 1972, the government announced that it 
would implement this system of license transfer to promote a 
turnover of divers and ameliorate the effect of diving diseases, 
but later that year it reversed its decision. The effect was that 
most divers felt· the change would eventually be made and 
those divers wishing to leave the industry remained in it an-
ticipating a 'windfall' profit when the legislation eventually 
changed. This can also be expected to have decreased the di-
vers' incentive. 
1975-1984 Transferable licenses 
In August 1974, the government allowed divers to sell their 
licenses to people wishing to enter the industry. This period 
was marked by generally rising levels of effort as divers fished 
more days of the year and more hours each day. This resulted 
in rising catches, as would be expected, but it was also associ-
ated with a slight overall rise in the CPUE, particularly on the 
west coast. There is evidence that a range of the factors dis-
cussed above influenced these trends. 
The initial period of license transferability was marked by 
an influx of experienced abalone divers, particularly in 1977, 
from the more northern Australian state of New South Wales 
(NSW) which resulted in a jump of the price of Tasmanian 
entitlements from $10 000 to $40 000. The abalone fishery in 
NSW was being reviewed at this time and the long-term out-
. look was poor, prompting many NSW divers to buy into Tas-
mania. These divers had a more professional approach to their 
diving, having come from the most competitive and heavily 
exploited abalone fishery in Australia. Their attitude intro-
duced new techniques and a new competitive spirit. Because 
of the warmer northern waters, NSW divers expected to dive 
more days per year than their Tasmanian counterparts. This 
may explain why the total level of effort increased. The rise in . 
CPUE observed on the east coast at this time is almost associ-
ated with the widespread introduction of deckhands. 
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In the period from 1983 to 1984, divers were anticipating 
the imposition of some restrictive management policy to con-
serve stocks which greatly increased their incentive as they 
tried to maximize cash flow before any restrictive legislation 
was passed. Effort and catch both increased by about 20-25%, 
effort because of more days and more hours per day dived as 
well as more fishing on the west coast. This was accompanied 
by marked and sustained increases in CPUE in 1969-1970 and 
1975-1976, but when the level of exploitation was lower in 
1983, it resulted in only a slight increase in CPUE, and CPUE 
declined in 1984. 
In 1984, it was announced that individual transferable quo-
tas would be introduced in the following year. Many divers 
believed that the immediate reduction in the average catch 
from 36 to 31 tons per diver would substantially reduce the 
value of entitlements and sold out during 1984. This led to a 
large number of new and inexperienced divers entering the 
industry. However, it is difficult to determine what changes 
this inexperience wrought, since it is confounded with the ma-
jor structural changes caused by the introduction of individual, 
transferable quotas (ITQs). 
1985-1986 Individual, transferable quotas 
In 1985, a system of individual, transferable quotas (28 units 
per diver, each unit being initially valued at 1.1 tons) was in-
troduced. The level of catch was further reduced in 1986 (each 
unit being valued at 1.0 ton). The introduction ofiTQs directly 
decreased the level of catch and effort and this, combined with 
rapidly rising prices ($14.00 per kg in 1986), has meant that 
there is less incentive for divers to dive in risky or uncomfort-
able areas. Divers say that the level of competition between 
them has gone down sharply since the introduction of ITQs, 
further reducing motivation. This reduction in motivation has 
been associated with a declining CPUE throughout the state, a 
fall in the percent of fishing effort allocated to the west coast, 
and a reduction in the number of hours dived each day and the 
number of days dived per year. Other factors have undoubtedly 
also influenced tl1e latest decline in CPUE, including the level 
of aggregate experience which declined through 1984 and de-
clining stock abundance, both of which have already been dis-
cussed. 
Summary of Tasmanian abalone fishery 
Figure 7 in many ways smarizes the large-scale picture of 
the Tasmanian abalone fishery. The average CPUE in each 
area should reflect the abundance at the best fishing areas, and 
we can see that this is driven by costs of fishing; the west coast 
has consistently higher CPUE than other areas. It may be obvi-
ous, but CPUE is entirely unrelated to total abundance of aba-
lone in a statistical area, high CPUE areas 7 and 8 have no more 
total removals than most of the east coast areas (20-31 ). Areas 
that have almost no catch at all (37-46) still have the same 
CPUE as most other areas. 
We were able to quantitatively discuss changes in one key 
motivational factor, price, and showed that changes in price 
are associated with changes in the behavior of divers. We be-
lieve that indebtedness is an even more important factor in 
motivation but have not been able to quantify levels of indebt-
edness. 
The historical approach to fisheries stock assessment was 
to try to calibrate CPUE sequences from large spatial areas as 
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shown in Fig. 5 and use this as an index of abundance as Har-
rison (1983) did. With spatially complex fisheries such an ap-
proach is very difficult, and we fmd it hard to imagine a 
circumstance under which it would prove useful. Since CPUE 
will be the result of a complex interaction between the spatial 
structure of the resource, and the fishermen's motivation and 
cost, it is hard to imagine how all these factors could be ac-
counted for. 
Implications of concentration profiles for 
management 
We have shown how concentration profiles make use of any 
aggregate CPUE data as an index of abundance very difficult. 
If one could obtain CPUE data on the spatial scale of the re-
source, that is patch by patch, catch and effort data could form 
a very effective monitoring tool. One could follow the evolu-
tion of effort, catch, and CPUE and probably understand the 
evolution of the fishery quite well. We know of no fisheries 
where such a detailed data collection system is currently in 
place, and there are many obstacles. First it would require very 
accurate mapping of catch and effort, at least for abalone, at a 
resolution finer than that offered by current GPS systems. For 
abalone such a system would have to be used by the diver under 
water. Even if such a system were possible, it is likely that the 
CPUE data would simply record when individual patches were 
fished to commercial extinction; the natural behavior of fisher-
men would be not to sample many sites with CPUE lower than 
those obtainable at other sights. Thus one would always be 
uncertain how many sites were available at CPUE less than the 
current commercial norm. 
The alternative to detailed mapping of CPUE would be to 
have a very intense stratified survey system, which would re-
cord both the number of patches of different densities as well 
as the total area ofthe patch. If each ofthe 120 licensed abalone 
divers were to dive two days per year in known areas and 
record the catch for that area, we would have an extremely 
valuable data base at very little cost to the management agency. 
In a situation such as this, with ITQs, it would probably be very 
easy to convince the divers that it was in their own interest to 
conduct such systematic surveys. Even if only half of them 
actually participated, the data would be most valuable. 
As more fisheries move to ITQ management, concentration 
profiles will play a major role in affecting the resulting CPUE. 
When ITQs are imposed on a fishery that has taken place in a 
very short period as, for instance, in the U.S. and Canadian 
fisheries for Pacific halibut, we might expect that CPUE would 
drop as the economic incentives for maximizing catch rate are 
replaced by economic incentives to maximize profits. How-
ever, if the fishery has taken place in a vety short period of 
time, the high CPUE sites were probably subject to intense 
competition for access, and many participants were likely 
forced to fish in lower CPUE sites. Under an ITQ fishery, with 
months instead of days to take the total catch, fishermen may 
then concentrate on the high CPUE sites and we should not be 
surprised at all by a rise in CPUE. 
A key biological concern is that reproductive success de-
pends on spawning density in many invertebrate species, and 
the natural behavior of fishetmen is to fish the highest density 
sites and thus destroy the most valuable breeding concentra-
tions. None of the current management tools in use, seasons, 
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size limits, total quota, or ITQ will prevent this rather natural 
behavior. Two possible methods to prevent the depletion of 
high-density sites are to set up sanctuaries at these sites, or to 
set up territorial fishing rights where the territory's owner(s) 
would have natural incentives to maintain the most valuable 
high-density concentrations. If reproductive concentrations are 
seasonal, then temporal closures could present overexploita-
tion of these concentrations. 
Concentration profiles pose a number of difficulties for 
tagging studies. If we are dealing with a large number of dis-
tinct populations, it will be natural to tag where high CPUE 
can be obtained, and indeed it is unlikely we would ever apply 
many tags in areas oflow CPUE. If the population is not evenly 
mixed, this means we would effectively be estimating the 
population in the high CPUE sites and ignoring, in our popu-
lation estimates, those individuals found in low CPUE sites·. 
This may not be critical to the individual study as the tagging 
study may be aimed at determining attributes of the high CPUE 
sites, but any attempt to estimate total abundance in a spatially 
structured fishery is bound to produce an underestimate. 
Thus far our discussion of concentration profiles has cen-
tered exclusively on the distribution of density. In spatially 
complex fisheries other factors differ from site to site and these 
too have an important impact on management. If, for instance, 
there is a complex spatial pattern of growth rates, as there is 
for abalone, then the appropriate size limit for one site may be 
very different from another one. Individuals in low productiv-
ity, slow-growth sites may never reach the legal size limit. 
When we expand our thinking of concentration profiles be-
yond pure abundance and begin to think of the invertebrate 
resources as complex spatial patterns, we see that many of the 
management approaches we have used are far from optimal. 
The presence of concentration profiles poses many chal-
lenges to managers. It is difficult both to monitor the stock 
abundance and find management regulations that will be ap-
propriate for the biology of the stock. One possible solution to 
both· of these problems is territorial fishing rights. If coopera-
tives, or individuals, are assigned the exclusive right to fish in 
certain areas, it will be in their interest to set up a survey system 
that monitors the abundance and to use harvest policies that 
are appropriate for the spatial variation in growth and mortal-
ity. Just as one cannot imagine large-scale regulation of what 
crops to plant or how much fertilizer to use for farmers facing 
a range of different soil types, it is impossible to imagine that 
any large-scale fishing regulations would be appropriate for 
spatially structured stocks. Detailed top-down monitoring and 
regulation by small spatial area is certainly another possibility, 
but this would be very expensive to maintain. 
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